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Abstract
Satellite constellation resiliency is an important consideration gaining momentum
at the top levels of the Air Force and at Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). The
increased availability of threats to satellite systems is challenging the capabilities
provided by space assets. More specifically, the global positioning system (GPS)
satellite constellation is utilized for a variety of missions, to include providing precise
geolocation information for navigation. Any degrade in GPS capabilities as observed
in an urban canyon environment or due to the loss of a GPS satellite may hinder
the overall mission. We use the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS)
to model the GPS constellation in an urban canyon environment which provides
information to a special operation force (SOF) in their effort to recover a weapon
of mass destruction (WMD). By varying the type of operations and the number
of satellites lost in the simulation, insight is gained into the impact of degradation
through the selected top level mission metrics. A series of statistical difference tests
and a designed experiment reveal a resiliency threshold on the number of satellites
removed from the constellation. As a result, we conclude that the GPS constellation
is resilient even after the loss of several satellites.
Key words: System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS), satellite constella-
tion resiliency, agent-based modeling, global positioning system (GPS), urban canyon
environment, weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
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ASSESSING GPS CONSTELLATION RESILIENCY IN AN URBAN CANYON
ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Satellite design is shifting from large monolithic satellites of the cold war to smaller
more disaggregated satellite constellations. The change is prompted by increasingly
accessible satellite degradation techniques which may inhibit national security by
reducing the support of mission critical space systems. Butler [8] states that, “All of
the Pentagon’s war plans are heavily reliant on satellite service, and the economies
of the U.S. [United States] and its allies also depend on spaceborne services such as
GPS [Global Positioning System] and communications for smooth operation”. Air
Force Space Command [3] (AFSPC) also states that, “U.S. reliance on space was a
potential Achilles Heel”. The vulnerability in our space systems is due to an inherent
susceptibility to a variety of threats as noted in the following statement by Dr. Stuart
Eves: “[a] spectrum of threats from [ASAT] weapons, RF weapons, cyber attacks,
demons conducting disruption or surveillance operations, physical attack on ground
infrastructure, laser weapons, charged and neutral particle beams, and camouflage
concealment and deception” [7]. U.S. satellite systems must be defended from these
threats to ensure national security.
Acting Air Force secretary Eric Fanning also recognizes the vulnerability of our
military space systems [20]. Interestingly, he notes that we do not necessarily need
an offensive capability to defend our space assets [20]. Overall, he asserts the need
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for, “new strategies and new architectures for space to try to increase resilience” [20].
General Shelton, former commander of AFSPC, echoes Mr. Fanning’s request for
an increase in satellite constellation resiliency [3]. As a result, the Space and Mis-
sile Center (SMC) of the United State Air Force (USAF) has conducted a Resilient
Enterprise Architecture Pathfinder (REAP) study, a leading project in space system
resiliency analysis. The results from the REAP study and other resiliency research
will have far reaching implications that will effect the design and acquisition process of
future satellite space systems. Ensuring the security and capability of military satel-
lite constellations through increasing efforts toward resiliency is essential for national
security.
1.2 Problem Definition
The focus of this thesis is on the comparison of resiliency metrics for the GPS
constellation under different levels of degradation. Resiliency is difficult to define
due to its applicability in many areas of study. It is even more difficult to find a
quantitative measurement to use as a standardized metric for comparing the resilience
of different systems. Measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness
(MOEs), and measures of outcome (MOOs) are all common quantitative metrics
available for a system. Selecting appropriate and universally accepted metrics is
essential for credible analysis.
1.3 Research Objective
The goal of this thesis is to successfully compare the resiliency of the GPS satellite
constellation in an urban canyon environment using quantitative metrics for a well
defined scenario. The metrics selected reflect overall top level mission priorities,
also known as MOOs. The MOOs are primarily drawn from the suggested measures
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found in the Literature Review along with the capabilities of the System Effectiveness
Analysis Simulation (SEAS) package. The thesis captures the simulation of the GPS
satellite constellation interacting with a blue force in a blue and red force conflict
scenario. MOOs are collected for a nominal scenario as well as for varying levels
of degraded performance representing system failures, environmental challenges, or
adversarial actions.
1.4 Research Scope
Simulation in this thesis is limited to a SEAS scenario provided by SMC. The
simulation models each of the satellites in the constellation as unique agents that can
be impacted by threats. Additionally, the thesis only compares the top level mission
focused MOOs instead of focusing on the low level technical MOEs and MOPs of the
system. The analysis of the simulation MOOs includes statistical Paired T tests and
proportion confidence interval comparisons between nominal and degraded scenarios
to provide insight into the system. Furthermore, a full factorial designed experiment
is performed to determine the most important factors for the selected MOOs. The
designed experiment has two factors with multiple levels which include the type of
scenario, either nominal or degraded, and the number of satellites removed from the
constellation from zero to ten. Both methods of analysis provide insight into the
resiliency of the GPS satellite constellation.
1.5 Thesis Overview
This thesis contains five chapters, the Introduction, Literature Review, Method-
ology, Analysis, and Conclusions. The Literature Review covers the definition of
resiliency and its associated metrics, an overview of the threats to satellite systems,
a description of the GPS constellation, and information on SEAS. The Methodology
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provides framework for the simulation and the scenario development. Next, the Anal-
ysis chapter focuses on the impact of the input parameters on the GPS constellation
and the insights gained on the GPS constellation’s resiliency. The Conclusion chapter
summarizes the important insights gained from the thesis along with identifying areas
for further research.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Overview
The Literature Review focuses on several areas which support resiliency analysis.
The first section identifies the applications of resiliency across many different areas of
study and selects a definition for space resiliency. Additionally, the section identifies
current investigations into satellite resiliency along with potential metrics for the
thesis. Second, the Literature Review examines threats to satellite systems and their
associated countermeasures, if applicable. Third, the Literature Review provides an
overview of the GPS satellite constellation and its capabilities. Fourth, the Literature
Review describes agent based modeling and its implementation in SEAS.
2.2 Resiliency
Applications.
There are an array of different definitions and applications for resiliency rang-
ing from ecology to economics [30]. One example is the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) which recognizes that resiliency analysis is still developing and does
not have standardized metrics [16]. Nevertheless, the EPA does see the applicabil-
ity of resiliency studies to better understand social-ecological systems [16]. The EPA
also references an organization titled the Resilience Alliance which specifically focuses
on social-ecological systems [31]. Additionally, Ohio State University has a Center
for Resilience that examines the resilience of industrial systems and their operation
[10]. Furthermore, research extends to the MITRE corporation which provides an
extensive list of resiliency metrics for the cyber domain [6]. As shown by the vari-
ety of different resiliency applications, Reid & Botterill [30] argue that ‘resiliency’ is
becoming convoluted and losing it meaning due to improper and over use. To add
5
to the convolution Reid & Botterill [30] note that resiliency can often be mistaken
as ‘recovery’ or ‘adaptability’ or ‘vulnerability’. The examples provided are a small
portion of the numerous applications of resiliency.
A specific example of space resiliency comes from Buckerfield de la Roche [7] who
comments on the events of the 2011 RUSI Space and National UK Security conference.
The conference was focused on increasing resiliency, which included a discussion on
cyber and military actions in the space domain. Space system resilience has also taken
hold in the United States where General Shelton, former Air Force Space Command
commander, provided the following statement:
Our satellites provide a strategic advantage for the U.S., and as such,
we must consider the vulnerabilities and resilience of our constellations.
My staff at headquarters Air Force Space Command, alongside the team
at the Space and Missile Systems Center, is leading efforts at balancing
resilience with affordability. [3]
Resiliency in space systems is important to overall military success and must be
defined for the proper application.
Definition.
Air Force Space Command provides a definition of resiliency: “Resiliency is the
ability of a system architecture to continue providing required capabilities in the
face of system failures, environmental challenges, or adversary actions” [3]. We use
AFSPC’s definition of resiliency for the remainder of the thesis. The definition is
unique because it encompasses other common resiliency definitions. For example, the
adaptability of a space system to threats may be a method for maintaining required
capabilities. Additionally, the definition speaks to the system architecture as a whole
instead of just specific portions of the system. The all encompassing definition allows
for resiliency to be applied not only to the satellite constellation, but also to the
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ground station and satellite operators who may be effected by threats to overall
resiliency.
Current Research.
Investigation into space system resiliency is a new area of study being explored by
a number of researchers including Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems. Northrop
Grumman argues that space system resiliency is best assessed by the ability of the
system to meet key performance parameters (KPPs). Northrop Grumman also iden-
tifies two different KPP approaches to assessing satellite resiliency under adversarial
threats: analytical and deterministic modeling. Analytical modeling aims to create
a mathematical function to objectively calculate resiliency. Then by comparing the
magnitude of the resiliency function for different systems, the most resilient system
can be selected. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems indicates that an analytical
model is difficult to create due to different opinions on the proper function to select for
resiliency measurement. Deterministic modeling instead focuses on the breakpoints
of the space system. Furthermore, in a deterministic model it appears as though
cost and reliability become metrics for comparison. Essentially, the deterministic
model compares the cost of the military space system as a ratio to the cost of the
threat. Comparing the ratio to possible alternative space systems helps determine
which system is more resilient. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems argues that
a deterministic model is most effective at identifying large differences in resiliency.
Intuitively, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems notes from initial results that
space systems that can be impacted from ground attacks (whether through a ground
station or from ground techniques) are less resilient. [26]
A more specific GPS constellation analysis thesis was produced in 2010 by Cap-
tain Bryan Bell at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) titled, “Assuming
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GPS Capabilities Under A Contested Space Environment: An Implementation Plan”.
Bell’s research focuses specifically on how best to augment the current GPS constella-
tion to retained its performance under degradation; thereby fulfilling the requirements
of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). For educational purposes only, Bell’s area
uses Taipei, Taiwan as his area of interest. His GPS constellation is modeled in the
Satellite Toolkit (STK) where augmentation satellites can be added and the mission
level technical metrics can be recorded. The principle metric Bell uses is the position
dilution of precision (PDOP), which is a common technical metric detailing the ge-
olocation geometry provided by the GPS constellation. The goal of his thesis is to
identify degraded scenarios where the average and maximum PDOP exceed a value
of six often enough to impact military operations and then improve those situations
with satellites to augment the constellation. He uses a variety of different satellite
augmentations to include the low Earth orbit (LEO) iridium-66 constellation, a highly
eccentric orbit (HEO) constellation, and a geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) con-
stellation. Bell concludes that the GPS constellation is a robust system that can be
best augmented by adding several satellites in GEO. One important insight gained
from the study is the importance of the geometry of the satellites over the area of
interest. He notes that scenarios with more satellites overhead does not necessarily
mean that the PDOP value will be lower than a constellation where fewer satellites
provide better geometry. While Bell’s research is important to consider moving for-
ward in the methodology of our study, the research presented in our study selects
different metrics and methods for analyzing satellite constellation resiliency. [5]
Available Metrics.
Selecting the correct metrics is crucially important to the validity of the final
anaylsis. The selected metrics are also important because they define what is rele-
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vant to the decision maker. Misinterpretation of the metrics could also occur without
a universal acceptance of the metrics. Furthermore, the selected metrics should be
parsimonious, allowing for flexibility and application to multiple scenarios. More
specifically, Connable references David Kilcullen’s opinion on the metrics used during
the war in Afghanistan. Kilcullen believes that using a single number as a metric,
such as the number of enemy casualties, can be dangerous when taken out of context.
Instead, Kilcullen recommends using ratios or percentages which can be more infor-
mative metrics. For example, the fire-to-fire ratio allows an analyst to observe which
side has the initiative and is more likely in control of the casualty rate. [12]
There are several quantitative metrics available for analyzing satellite system re-
siliency. For example, Cornara et al. [13] states that all satellite constellations aim
to provide a minimum level of service. Bell believes that a PDOP value of six defines
minimum GPS service [5]. Cornara et al. [13] also suggests using mean revisit time
and mean percentage of coverage during the simulation as measures of quality of the
constellation. The REAP study focuses on MOEs and uses availability, user range
error, vertical error, horizontal error, and integrity as metrics [22]. The REAP study
also references several MOOs to include target production rate, target strike accu-
racy, total targets destroyed, and days to end of conflict [22]. Other potential MOOs
include the accuracy of weapons, the amount of required ordinance, the number of
civilian casualties, and the amount of fuel expended by the satellite. It is also im-
portant to remember that the selected metrics must also only be calculated over the
area of interest. The selected area might be a specific geographic region or a more
general bound of latitude and longitude.
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Improvements to Constellations.
There are several considerations for enhancing satellite constellation resiliency.
The first is that a constellation with a smaller number of orbital planes reduces the
impact of satellite degradation and also achieves levels of service earlier in the deploy-
ment phases. The second consideration is the possibility of having reserve satellites
ready for operation in a degraded environment. Cornara et al. [13] references three
general options for replacement satellites. The best option is to have additional satel-
lites in the orbital planes ready for operation. This option is generally implemented
for position, naviagation, and timing (PNT) constellations or any other constella-
tions which demand continuous functionality. The second most reactive method is
to have spare satellites in parking orbits which can be transferred into operation
when required. The final option, generally used by less essential systems such as
Earth observation platforms, is to have back up satellites on the ground waiting for
launch. Depending upon the objective of the satellite system and its overall mission
importance, the correct resiliency method can be implemented. [13]
2.3 Threats
Military satellite systems are crucial to the U.S. however, they are also highly
vulnerable. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems [26] states that, “especially trou-
bling are the low cost and short cycle times of very effective threats when compared
with the investments that are made in [Department of Defense] space systems”. Airst
[4] also states that, “[t]hreat[s] [have] expanded from nation-state to informed hobbi-
est”. The escalation of the availability of threats only increases the need for research
into space system resiliency.
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Foreign Countries.
China has recently demonstrated the ability to destroy a satellite in LEO and
potentially degrade optical payloads with lazer dazzling [3]. Pawlikowski et al. [28]
recognizes that China is attempting to weaken the United States, who is increasingly
reliant on their space capabilities. The Chinese launch of an anti-satellite (ASAT)
missile was an attack the United States could only observe and not take action against
[28]. Additionally, Pawlikowski et al. [28] states that China is not the only concern,
other states and even non-state actors could also impact space systems. As foreign
countries develop their technology and become more capable, the United States will
have to protect the GPS constellation from jamming, spoofing, cyber, and kinetic
threats. [28]
Jamming.
Jamming is a common and easily implementable threat available to most foreign
actors. Pawlikowski et al. [28] states,
The [t]echnological capability to jam satellites is fairly simple and can
be easily assembled by either individuals or nations for a fairly modest
investment. Multiple reports of both state and nonstate groups jamming
satellites have been seen over the last decade. GPS jammers are well
known and offered openly for sale on the Internet. Satellite transit times
are available from several websites and can be downloaded onto smart
phones.
Additionally, jamming a GPS antennae does not require more than a few picowatts
of energy [4]. As a result, foreign militaries have jammers that can output megawatts
of power which are highly effective [4]. Furthermore, jamming can occur through
attacks on the narrow band, broadband, and spread spectrum [4].
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More specifically, North Korea’s usage of jammers since 2003 during the Iraq war
has been confirmed, along with reports of China also having jammers [4]. Iran also
claims to have taken control of a lost U.S. stealth drone in 2011 by jamming its GPS
connection [9]. An Iranian engineer claims that, “The GPS navigation is the weakest
point...By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into
autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain” [9]. General Moharam Gholizadeh
of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps believes that Iran can even control
GPS-guided missiles [9]. Furthermore, even civilians have access to jammers in order
to ward off vehicle tracking devices [4].
The DoD is aware of the jamming threat and, as a result, the new GPS satellites
will have increased capability to prevent jamming [11]. There are also several defensive
techniques to combat jamming. Inherent in a GPS satellite is, “[t]he ability to reject
noise [which] also implie[s] a powerful ability to reject most forms of jamming or
deliberate interference” [27]. The military also uses the p-code from the GPS satellite
which is more resistant to jamming [27]. Nevertheless, jamming is still a potential
threat to GPS satellites, which can degrade overall mission effectiveness.
Spoofing.
Spoofing is another type of attack which is applied to GPS receivers [21]. By sim-
ply adding a time delay to a GPS signal, adversaries can “spoof” or confuse a GPS
receiver adding errors to position estimations and providing incorrect time stamps [4].
Errors in position estimates can be devastating for the military technology which aims
to hit targets with precision in order to use a minimal amount of ordinance. Further-
more, the probability of civilian casualties also increases if an ordinance receives even
the slightest error measurement from its guidance system. Another example from
Airst [4] centers aounrd the stock market which is heavily dependent upon the time
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information provided by GPS satellites. If a company can control the time stamp for
trades in the market, they can easily manipulate stock trading in order to sell high
and buy low [4].
Airst [4] argues that spoofing is a significant threat to GPS, primarily due to its
inexpensive cost, quick availability, and hidden implementation. There are several
devices which are readily available that can spoof GPS receivers. A GPS simulator
is the most simplistic option, however, its large size and expense makes it difficult to
implement [21]. The next step in complexity is the use of a single software defined
GPS receiver to provide a false GPS signal [21]. The final step in complexity is an
orchestrated group of software defined GPS receivers [21]. Fortunately, there is still
additional software and hardware development required before a software defined GPS
receiver can become an effective spoofing device [21]. Additionally, Airst [4] states
that there are not any readily available solutions to eliminate spoofing.
There are, however, several potential options to minimize the impact of spoofing
attacks. Humphreys et al. [21] states that, “Cryptographic authentication is arguably
the most secure solution [to spoofing], but would require modification of the civil GPS
signal structure, making it an unlikely short-term solution”. One of the next best
options for spoofing detection is to use multiple clocks in the satellite system and
ensure they all are in synch [4]. If the clocks are disperate, then the GPS satellite can
use an “advanced disciplining algorithm” to place the clocks at the correct time [4].
Nevertheless, more research and development must be performed to find a simple yet
effective countermeasure to spoofing attacks.
Cyber.
Persistent cyber threats also permeate into the space domain due to a satellite’s
inherent dependence upon computer technology. Air Force Space Command [3] states
13
that, “[s]pace systems that rely on complex software and radio-frequency links could
be susceptible to [cyber] attacks, despite robust cryptographic protection”. To make
matters worse, Air Force Space Command [3] states that, “[c]yberspace threats, in
particular, have exceptionally low barriers to entry and are growing rapidly.” Cyber
threats are so inexpensive and readily available that an adversary would be ill-advised
not to attempt such an attack on the U.S. [9].
Caplan [9] more specifically states that, “satellite vulnerability to cyber attacks
has emerged as a threat to U.S. national security, as the U.S. military is increasingly
dependent on satellite communications”. It is also important to understand that the
military is heavily dependent upon civilian satellites for telecommunication. Increased
DoD dependence will result in more cyber attacks toward the poorly protected com-
mercial communication satellites. Caplan [9] also states that Chinese military doc-
trine suggests attacking space-to-ground communication along with the associated
satellite ground stations during a conflict. China is also actively involving several of
their electronic companies in intelligence gathering and cyber communications. [9]
A specific example of a satellite cyber attack occurred in 2011 when two environ-
mental imaging satellites were hacked. The hacker was able to access the satellite
control system which could have destroyed the satellite. Fortunately the hacker did
not issue any commands leaving the satellite unharmed. A statement from the pres-
ident of Intelsat General Corps states, “In 2011 alone, IntelsatONE, the terrestrial
network that links customers to Intelsat’s geosynchronous communications satellite,
identified about 300,000 denial-of-service attacks” [9]. Furthermore, the loss of the
stealth drone in 2011 also reveals the vulnerability of GPS to cyber attacks. Cyber
threats pose a serious threat to space systems and are increasingly prevalent. [9]
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Kinetic.
Satellites are also highly vulnerable to kinetic attacks. In 2007, China destroyed a
weather satellite with an anti-satellite missile in an effort to shake U.S. dominance in
space [1]. The weather satellite was in LEO, however, a Japanese intelligence official
reports that China is hoping to target GPS satellites in future conflicts [1]. Lieutenant
General Michael Hamel, former director of SMC, states that, “[a] ‘nightmare’ scenario
is for multiple satellites used by the Pentagon to ‘blink off’, indicating a hostile–
possibly kinetic anti-satellite–campaign against the U.S. space assets” [8].
In response to the Chinese ASAT mission, Senator Jon Kyl recommends several
actions which should be taken to minimize the threat [2]. Specifically, Senator Kyl
states that efforts should be focused on replacing lost satellites quickly [2]. Another
option is to quickly identify the ASAT threat and maneuver the targeted satellite to
avoid the ASAT [8]. However, Colonel Shawn Barnes, chief of AFSPC Space Superior-
ity Division, states, “[t]oday, we could ascertain that we were under attack–especially
from a direct-ascent [ASAT], but we do not have the tools to rapidly assemble all the
evidence, and disseminate it in a way that enables collaborative decision making” [8].
Although there are theoretical options available to counter ASATs, further research
is needed before there is a concrete solution.
2.4 PNT Satellite Systems
Definition.
Position, navigation, and timing satellites are used in both military and civilian
applications. The most familiar PNT satellite constellation is the Global Positioning
System which is owned and operated by the United States Air Force [11]. GPS is
not the only PNT satellite constellation orbiting Earth. Several other countries and
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conglomerates also have their own constellations. The European Union is construct-
ing a 30 satellite constellation called Galileo for enhanced civilian GPS coverage in
conjunction with GPS [33]. The Russians are using a system called Glonass and the
Chinese are using their system called Beidou. Each PNT constellation is similar in
theory, but varied in application.
The concept of GPS originated with NAVSTAR developed by U.S. government in
the 1970’s [27]. GPS has continually developed and today we are launching the GPS
Block IIF. There is also currently a contract with Lockheed Martin to produce GPS
III as the next revolution in GPS satellites [24]. Impressively, GPS has continued to
provide uninterrupted service since its release to the public in 1995 [33]. The military
uses GPS for navigation and guiding precision weapons, “which are key strategic
weapons for the United States” [1] [27]. Civilians also use GPS for a multitude of
tasks to include search and rescue, land surveying, and aircraft collision avoidance
systems just to name a few [27].
GPS satellites nominally operate by transmitting a ranging signal which is col-
lected at a GPS receiver [27]. Since the speed of the GPS signal is a known constant,
the GPS receiver can take the difference between the signal transmit time and received
time to calculate the distance from the satellite to the receiver [24]. Through the use
of atomic clocks, GPS satellites are able to coordinate their time stamps associated
with their ranging signal, which is essential in reducing position error [27]. Collecting
distances from multiple satellites allows the GPS receiver to locate itself based upon
the only possible intersection of the ranging signal from the satellites [24].
Capabilities.
In order to ensure the highest global precision for military efforts, the GPS con-
stellation must provide a minimum of 24 operational satellites [11]. The constellation
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has six nominally circular planes inclined at 55 degrees each with four operational
GPS satellites per plane. Each GPS satellite has a period of 12 hours. Addition-
ally, a GPS receiver must be able to receive GPS data from a minimum of four of
the 24 available satellites in order to provide three-dimensional location information.
The more satellites a receiver can process and the larger the angle between received
satellites, the better the position estimation. [27]
There are several options for GPS constellation improvement that may increase
overall performance. One option is to add six satellites, one more in each orbital plane,
in order to increase coverage. The new 30 GPS constellation will show improvements
in the number of GPS satellites available to the receiver. Another option is to add an
equatorial orbital plane that will aid in providing coverage to the mid-latitude regions
which are most susceptible to having a fewer number of visible GPS satellites. An
increase in coverage also creates another plane which adds to the complexity of the
constellation. A final consideration is changing the orbital period of additional GPS
satellites to either a six hour orbit in a lower altitude or a 24 hour geosynchronous orbit
in a higher altitude [5]. All of the considerations could improve the GPS constellation,
however, the gained performance must be weighted against the increased complexity
and cost. [27]
Despite the benefits of the GPS constellation, it is not without programmatic
delays and error. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides a study
from 2009 on the setbacks experienced with the GPS constellation upgrade. The study
identifies the effects of operating under a diminished GPS constellation. For example,
the precision guided munitions used by the military would be less accurate leading
to larger or multiple ordinances necessary to ensure the same mission success [1] [11].
Additionally, in the civilian sector, commercial aircraft and 911 emergency responders
would also be effected due to decreased accuracy from GPS location estimates [11].
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Urban Canyon Environment.
The urban canyon environment is one type of challenging environment which
is characterized by tall buildings, long narrow streets with a minimum number of
intersections, tunnels, and elevated railways, all of which can negatively impact GPS
effectiveness [34]. Vicek et al. [34] states that, “[r]eflected signals and relatively poor
geometries make GPS derived position fixes less accurate than those made in a more
benign environment”. Japan experiences habitually unstable GPS service due to the
effects of their urban canyon environment [29]. As a result, they are launching four
new satellites to augment the GPS constellation over Japan in order to reduce multi
path errors and increase satellite availability [29]. The first quasi-zenith satellite is
currently supporting Japan and has shown an improvement from 39.5% to 60.9%
availability over one of the test cities [15]. Continuing plans indicate the launch of
two more quasi-zenith satellites along with a geosynchronous satellite by 2018 [29].
The challenges posed by an urban canyon environment are a reality that cannot be
ignored in a combat scenario.
2.5 Agent-Based Modeling
Definition.
Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is used to model complex adaptive
systems (CAS) potentially made up of many different types of agents. North & Macal
[25] state that, “Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is founded on the
notion that the whole of many systems or organizations is greater than the simple
sum of its constituent parts”. The smaller constituent parts can in turn generate
larger emergent behaviors. One of the principal strengths of ABMS is to identify
the connections between low and high level behavior. A simple analogy for low level
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actions causing emergent behavior is the “wave” commonly produced at sporting
events. North & Macal [25] state that, “Each person or agent makes small, simple
movements, but the group as a whole produces complex large-scale results”. By
accurately modeling the agents and CAS of an ABMS, emergent behaviors can be
identified and assessed. [25]
ABMS is used in this thesis to analyze a highly complex weapon of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) removal scenario. The model is complex due to the multitude of support
assets to the blue and red forces which have a unique impact on the ability of the
special operations force (SOF) to complete the mission. It is important to remember
that the agent based model for this thesis is heavily dependent upon the blue and
red force agents. However, the focus of the study is on the satellites supporting the
agents during the simulation. As a result, the efforts of this thesis is not on re-coding
the agent behavior, but instead changing the CAS supporting the agents.
SEAS.
The System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is a computer simulation
developed for military utility analysis which supports acquisition programs and sys-
tem development. SEAS is most often used for scenario focused simulations between
opposing forces. The simulation software revolves around ABMS which allows entities
to react based upon their perception of the environment and their pre-programmed
rule structure. Agent-based modeling allows entities to exhibit complex-adaptive be-
havior which emerges from the guiding rules structure and entity interaction. SEAS
also provides a visual display of the simulation which is useful for verification and
debugging portions of the analysis. Furthermore, SEAS is a part of the Air Force
Standard Analysis Toolkit and continues to be used for studies in military analysis
by a variety of users. [32]
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The scenario of interest has been previously developed in SEAS for the analysis of
the GPS in an urban combat environment. The code contains a large array of both
blue and red forces governed by their unique rule structure. Each of the coded rule
structures contributes to the emergent behavior of the entire system. Interpreting
the model is aided by the visual display of the agents moving in the region of inter-
est. Furthermore, SEAS collects simulation statistics which can be transformed into
resiliency metrics. As a result, SEAS is an adequate simulation software to assess
satellite resiliency in our scenario.
2.6 Summary
Accurately modeling satellite resiliency is a difficult task which begins by estab-
lishing a definition for resiliency. The definition selected for the study comes from Air
Force Space Command which focuses on a system’s ability to continue providing re-
quired capabilities during periods of degradation. There have been several studies on
satellite resiliency along with a variety of proposed metrics. Ultimately, the metrics
selected in this study depend upon the definition of resiliency and the capabilities of
the modeling software. Resiliency has become an important topic in constellation de-
sign because the increasing number of threats to satellite systems. Today more than
ever, satellites are susceptible to kinetic, cyber, and electromagnetic threats from a
variety of enemies. PNT constellations in particular provide a crucial capability that
must be maintained if at all possible. In order to assess the resiliency of a satellite
constellation, the agent-based SEAS program is used to model a scenario impacted by
GPS performance. The next chapter on Methodology will further develop the process
for assessing the resiliency of the GPS constellation under degradation.
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III. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
The Methodology focuses on several areas connected to the selected scenario, re-
siliency metrics, model developments, and the proposed analysis techniques. The first
section provides an overview of the selected scenario along with a presentation of the
logical process flow and a description of the blue and red force structures. The origi-
nal model description concludes with the model assumptions and input parameters.
Next, we present the chosen resiliency metrics along with a description of the model
developments. After the model developments we discuss the proposed analysis tech-
niques, which includes the traditional nominal and degraded model statistical test
comparison. The final analysis technique describes a designed experiment which is
intended to assess the key components of each resiliency metric. Each of the sections
in the Methodology builds a framework for the analysis of the selected scenario.
3.2 Scenario
Description.
The selected scenario focuses on the performance of the GPS constellation in an
urban canyon environment [14]. Air Force SMC/XR Military Utility Analysis (MUA)
squadron first used the scenario to study the capabilities of GPS satellites in stressed
environments [14]. Furthermore, SMC/XR selected SEAS to develop an urban canyon
environment due to its short build up time, internal resource availability, and the
ability to use previous studies [14].
The model simulates an agent based SOF team moving through a Middle Eastern
city searching for a WMD. The scenario begins with the SOF team landing in the
city and heading directly to the WMD. After the WMD has been secured, the SOF
21
team navigates through the city to an evacuation location. Successful navigation is
aided by the GPS receiver embedded with the SOF team. Major degradations to the
GPS constellation can cause the SOF team to lose its position knowledge which can
lead to enemy engagements and an extend mission duration. When the SOF team
successfully makes it to the evacuation location the mission is considered a success.
[14]
The simulation is governed by a complex logic process which is focused around
the SOF team as they transit to the evacuation location. The SOF team selects
which evacuation location is the best option and navigates to the location. In the
process, it is highly likely that the SOF team encounters red forces which can deter
the evacuation of the WMD. Once the SOF team reaches the evacuation location,
they will secure their position and fend off enemy advances until they can be airlifted
to safety. The logical process flow is summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Logical Process Flow [14]
Model Parameters.
The urban canyon scenario has several input parameters that can be changed to
reflect desired design points. The first four parameters are GPS constellation specific
which represent the accuracy, availability, and timeliness of the GPS constellation
along with number of satellites removed due to degradation. GPS accuracy is defined
in meters and represents the position accuracy given to the GPS receiver utilized by
the SOF team. The smaller the value of GPS accuracy represents a higher effective-
ness of the GPS constellation. GPS availability is scaled from 0 to 1 and represents
the probability that the GPS constellation is able to provide geolocation information.
A lower probability of availability is used to simulate the impact of the urban en-
vironment which may reduce the chances of contacting the GPS satellite. Another
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GPS parameter is timeliness which reflects the amount of time required for the GPS
receiver to provide geolocation information to the SOF team. Additionally, the num-
ber of GPS satellites removed is another parameter used to impact the constellation.
For example, one of the design points might require five of the original ten satellites
in view to be removed from the simulation to reflect a period of degradation. The
combination of the four GPS parameters allows for top level mission control of the
GPS constellation. It is important to note that the simulation does not use a detailed
GPS geolocation algorithm or provide a highly detailed perspective on the satellite
constellation. Instead, the program focuses on using the higher level input parameters
to reflect the capabilities of the GPS constellation. Each of the GPS parameters and
their range of possible values are summarized in Table 1. [14]
Table 1. GPS Parameters
Input Parameters
Range Accuracy Availability Timeliness Number of Satellites Removed
Best 5 m 0.95 5 min 0
Worst 40 m 0.34 5 min 10
Several other input parameters for the scenario include the number of Predator
surveillance aircraft, the involvement of the police, and the ability to use visual cues.
The number of Predator surveillance aircraft help identify red force threats in the
simulation as they circle the area of interest. The involvement of police pertains to
the ability of red police to engage the SOF team in combat instead of just identifying
their presence. The ability to use visual cues corresponds to the SOF team and their
ability to navigate aided by landmarks instead of only using the GPS receiver. For
this study these parameters remain constant and are not adjusted between scenarios.
As a result, the number of Predators surveillance aircraft will be kept at two, the
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police do not directly contribute to military engagements, and the SOF team is able
to use visual cues.
Force Composition.
SOF Team.
The principal component of the blue forces is the 50 soldier SOF team. Several
rules of engagement govern the actions of the agent based SOF team. The first rule
states that the SOF team does not engage in combat unless they are fired upon from
the red military forces. If, however, the SOF team is engaged by red military forces,
then they are drawn into the fight. The SOF retreats from the battle if they are
outnumbered by a 3:1 margin. Furthermore, the SOF team does not interact with
the red civilians and attempts to evade the red police forces. Each of the rules of
engagement is processed at every time step in the simulation in order to determine
the SOF team actions. [17]
Additionally, the SOF team movements are heavily reliant upon their confidence in
the GPS geolocation estimation which is dependent upon the number of GPS satellites
available. For example, once fewer than six GPS satellites are available, then the SOF
team decreases their movement speed. The most extreme impact occurs when there
are fewer than four GPS satellites. More accurate movements of the SOF team leads
to a shorter mission duration with a minimal loss of life. [17]
Blue Forces.
The SOF team is primarily aided by the GPS constellation. The modeled con-
stellation is composed of the 32 current GPS satellites which are listed based upon
their different design blocks. The Tactical Programming Language (TPL) code for
the GPS satellites is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. GPS Satellites in TPL Code
Each of the satellites is governed by two line element (TLE) data in the gps-
ops.txt file attached to the overall SEAS scenario warfile. The TLE files have all been
updated as of November 2014. An example of the TLE code is annotated and shown
in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. GPS TLE Example
Each of the GPS satellites orbit the Earth as dictated in the TLE data and are
included in the target list for the GPS Unit. The GPS Unit provides input to the
GPS receiver which is used by the SOF team. The SOF team is most aided by a GPS
constellation that has a low value for accuracy, high probability of availability, low
timeliness, and a high number of visible GPS satellites.
The blue forces are also composed of several additional support assets which pro-
vide airlift and surveillance. Airlift is accomplished through the CV-22 which deliv-
ers the SOF team in the city and recovers the SOF team from the evacuation point.
Surveillance is made possible through the interactions of several different platforms in
continual communication. The Predator and Global Hawk units help identify enemy
red targets throughout the city as they circle over the area of interest. Additionally,
a carrier support group is included in the simulation to help relay the information
between the blue forces. The combination of the support elements are not specifically
studied in this analysis, however, it is important to understand that they provide the
transportation and communication structure for the blue forces.
Red Forces.
The red force structure is composed of several generic unit categories to include
military forces, police, and civilians. Red military units are the main threat to the
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SOF team and engage in combat whenever possible. The red military is composed
of six trucks with 11 soldiers per truck. If the red military engages the SOF team
but the number of red military forces do not exceed three times the number of blue
forces, then the red forces retreat. The red forces follow the blue forces until red
reinforcements arrive. The red military is also programmed to act autonomously from
the red police, however, the red military reacts to SOF team locations transmitted
over the red police radio. The red police are less numerous and less threatening to
the SOF team. They do not engage the SOF team, but proceed about their normal
patrols. The police act regionally around their five different police stations and use
motorcycles and station wagons as fast transportation. If the red police encounter the
SOF team, they broadcast the SOF team location which can be intercepted by the
red military. Additionally, the police can be informed about the SOF team location
from red civilians. The red civilians continue to grow in number throughout the
simulation and move randomly throughout the city. If a civilian encounters the SOF
team, then there is a 50 percent chance that they inform the police. The complex red
force structure is heavily dependent upon the communication of SOF team’s current
location. If the civilians and police can communicate effectively, then the red military
will be more successful at engaging the SOF team. [17]
Model Assumptions.
The urban canyon scenario has several assumptions built into the model. A list
of the model assumptions are summarized below [17]:
1. GPS accuracy is degraded when the SOF team is near a building.
2. An agent’s position knowledge is impacted by input parameters.
3. A specific geolocation algorithm is not necessary.
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4. The SOF team must maneuver through the streets to reach the evacuation
location.
5. The CV-22 is not impacted by GPS degradation.
The first critical assumption is the degradation of GPS accuracy as the SOF team
moves closer to buildings. One example provided from the model designers is that
the accuracy of GPS can decrease from 2-m to 30-m when the SOF team moves to
within a certain distance to the buildings [17]. Another important assumption in
the model is that the SOF team’s position knowledge is adjusted by three model
input parameters, GPS accuracy, availability, and timeliness [17]. Furthermore, the
simulation does not use a specific geolocation algorithm, but instead relies on top-level
characteristics of GPS to determine position. Each of the assumptions help construct
a top-level mission model as opposed to a more detailed tactical engagement level
model.
3.3 Model Development
Tactical Programming Language.
Agents within SEAS are governed by logic found in the TPL code. In the sce-
nario simulation code there is a section for “orders” for each agent where the TPL
statements are located. The TPL associate logic statements with each agent which
enable specific behavior. Conventional logical statements are available in the TPL
to include, arrays, variable manipulation, condition statements, logic loops, and a
multitude of both user defined and pre-defined functions. Minimal changes to the
TPL code are implemented in the scenario of interest to maintain the validity of the
current model. Nevertheless, understanding the syntax and proper implementation
of different TPL statements is essential to ensuring accurate analysis. [18]
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Modifications.
To maintain the current model validity, only minor changes are made to the urban
canyon scenario. Additionally, the analysis does not require any additional output
variables from the model which greatly simplifies the model development. Instead,
model development focuses on logic structure changes along with the changes in
the number of available GPS satellites. Each of the model developments are used in
combination with input parameter changes to create the degraded scenarios described
in the Analysis Approach section.
One modification aims to remove available satellites from the model. Removing
satellites is key to assessing overall constellation resiliency and can be accomplished
by selectively commenting out satellites. Any number of satellites can be randomly
or purposely selected within the model for omission. One example is the removal of
the most recently deployed GPS Block IIF series satellites of which there are seven
included in the original simulation. To remove satellites from consideration, they
must be commented out from both the group definition of the GPS Sats.inc file along
with the satellite force definition in the pnt.war file. Removing satellites can be
representative of many real world threats to include, kinetic strikes, cyber attacks,
environmental weather variations, and system failure.
The second modification is an addition to the GPS Unit logic structure. In the
original model, the SOF team would receive a decrease in overall travel speed if less
than six GPS satellites were available on the target list. To expand the original model
and connect the GPS Unit more directly to the scenario, the logic statements also
include changes to the input parameters of GPS accuracy and availability. Addition-
ally, the logic statements are expanded to provide changes to the input parameters
for every number of available GPS satellites under ten. The input parameters are
changed through a increasing linear scale for GPS availability and a decreasing expo-
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nential scale for GPS accuracy as the number of satellites on the target list increases.
A view of the proposed factors in the logic development is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. GPS Unit Parameter Factors per Number of GPS Satellites
Multiplication Factor
Number of Visible GPS Satellites Accuracy Availability Speed
≤ 4 4 0.4 0.5
5 3.17 0.5 0.75
6 2.52 0.6 0.9
7 2 0.7 0.9
8 1.59 0.8 0.9
9 1.26 .9 0.9
10 1 1 1
The logic factors are translated into specific values for accuracy and availability
based on either nominal or degraded operations. The realized values are summarized
in Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 4. Translated GPS Accuracy
Figure 5. Translated GPS Availability
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3.4 Selected Metrics
The analysis in this study focuses on answering the fundamental question of GPS
constellation resiliency. As a result of the challenges noted in the Literature Review,
the metrics needed to capture GPS resiliency must be insightful and cleverly devel-
oped. Furthermore, the metrics must be accessible within the current scenario and
cannot require drastic changes in the SEAS TPL code. Limiting the changes in the
code and utilizing already available model outputs allow the model to maintain its
validity. In order to derive the appropriate metrics, a series of top level mission pri-
orities are established. Each of the selected metrics connect back to one of the four
campaign priorities. The list of campaign priorities are shown below:
1. WMD recovery at all costs;
2. Minimize blue force casualties;
3. Minimize mission duration; and
4. GPS is functioning as intended.
Probability that more than 50% of SOF Team Survives (P50).
P50 is derived from the number of replications where fewer than 50% casualties
are sustained by the SOF team. The metric connects back to the first and second
campaign level priorities which reflect the proportion of time that the WMD has been
successfully removed with fewer than 25 SOF team casualties. Instead of stopping the
simulation once the SOF team casualties exceed 25, we chose to allow the simulation
to continue running which represents a need to remove the WMD at all costs. As a
result, the mission is classified through the output data by observing if there are more
than 25 casualties in the replication. If the metric varies greatly across scenarios then,
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it is possible to argue that degraded GPS is hindering the mission and the constellation
is not exhibiting resiliency.
Mission Duration.
Mission duration assesses the impact of being lost as a result of GPS degradation.
The metrics connects directly to the third campaign level priority which aims to
reduce the total duration of the mission. An extend mission duration can occur
if the GPS constellation is degraded by having a fewer number of satellites which
decreases accuracy and availability and increases the probability of being lost. Any
additional time lost is a sign of failure of the GPS constellation to provide the required
capabilities indicating a lack of resiliency.
Number of Blue Casualties.
The number of blue casualties connects to the second campaign level priority
and provides insight into the SOF team losses. The metric is designed to assess the
number of casualties as a result of degraded GPS as opposed to poor battle tactics.
Intuitively, the number of casualties should increase with an increase in the number of
engagements. Reducing the number of engagements is heavily dependent upon correct
position data from the GPS constellation. As a result, significant differences in the
amount of blue casualties across scenarios reflects a weakness and lack of resiliency
of the GPS constellation.
Number of Engagements.
The number of engagements is intertwined with the number of blue casualties
and is therefore also connected to the second campaign level priority. Reducing the
number of engagements leads to a decreased loss of life along with a decreased mission
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duration. The best way to avoid engagements is to move precisely through the city
to the evacuation point. The number of engagements is included along with the
number of casualties to help decipher if GPS is having an impact which may be
disguised by a resilient SOF team which does not suffer a large amount of casualties
per engagement. As a result, if the number of engagements significantly increases
with GPS degradation, then it is possible to conclude that the GPS constellation is
not providing the required capability and is therefore not exhibiting resiliency.
Blue Casualties per Number of Engagements.
As noted earlier in the Literature Review, a ratio metric can provide more infor-
mation beyond just the output from a single variable [12]. Nevertheless, the ratio
between the number of casualties and the engagements did not yield any interesting
results or insight throughout the analysis. As a result, the specific ratio metric is not
considered for the study.
Proportion of Time Lost to Mission Duration.
The proportion between the amount of time the SOF team is lost and the total
mission duration connects directly to the third campaign level priority which aims to
reduce the total mission duration. When the SOF team losses its position knowledge
due to a degraded GPS constellation and is lost, the intuitive result is an increased
mission duration. It can be difficult to interpret the specific values of the metric,
however, any increase in the metric indicates an increased amount of time being
wasted. A statistical difference comparison between the scenarios provides insight
into GPS constellation resiliency.
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Percentage of Time that the Number of GPS Satellites is less than 4.
The average percentage of time that less than four GPS satellites are in view
reflects the functionality of the constellation. GPS is specifically designed to provide
accurate geolocation data to a receiver with a minimum of four GPS satellites [27]. If
the number of GPS satellites in view drops below four, then it is reasonable to argue
that the SOF team movements are significantly impacted and the successful removal
of the WMD is diminished. The metric specifically relates back to the fourth priority
which is concerned with the functionality of GPS. If the GPS constellation is not
functioning as intended, then from a top level mission perspective, the substantial
monetary investment in GPS is not providing the expected return in capability.
Percentage of Time that the Number of GPS Satellites is greater than
6.
A similar metric is connected to the functionality and intended operation of the
GPS constellation. While the previous metric aims to collect data on the minimal
number of satellites required for geolocation, the GPS constellation is ideally created
to provide highly accurate geolocation achievable from a large number of satellites.
Collecting statistics on having more than six GPS satellites provides information on
the portion of the mission which is receiving high quality GPS information. As the
model is degraded, it may not be possible for the GPS constellation to retain more
than six satellites in view which indicates a loss of resiliency to provide the high
resolution data to the SOF team.
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3.5 Analysis Approach
Scenario Comparison.
The first method of analysis compares the set of selected metrics across modified
scenarios using statistical difference tests. Each scenario is defined by either a nominal
or degraded starting operational condition which can be further degraded by removing
a number of the satellites attained from the initial target list. The objective is to
determine if there is a significant difference between the metrics from one scenario
to another. We use the Paired T test for any continuous or integer metrics. For any
percentage or proportion metric we perform a classical difference of proportions test
in place of a Paired T.
Nominal Operations.
In an effort to represent current scenario performance, the nominal operations are
defined by expected GPS constellation input parameters. The two most important
parameters are the GPS accuracy and availability which are set at 5 meters and 95%
respectfully. It is reasonable to assume that the GPS constellation is not perfect, but it
is however highly accurate and readily available. GPS timeliness is kept at five seconds
which was the fastest value used by the previous model developers. Additionally, the
model includes two Predators, the police do not engage in combat, and the SOF team
is able to use landmarks as mentioned previously.
Degraded Operations.
The degraded operations reflect a minor loss of GPS capability. The only changes
made to the nominal operations are the reduction of GPS accuracy and availability.
GPS accuracy is increased to 10 meters and the availability is reduced to 85%. The
degraded scenario represents the impact of the urban canyon environment where the
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geolocation estimates can be impacted along with the connection to the GPS satellites.
The remaining input variables remain the same as those in the nominal operations.
Satellite Removal.
In order to simulate the loss of satellites due to the array of threats mentioned in
the Literature Review, satellites are purposefully eliminated from the program code.
The satellites selected for removal are attained from the initial target list of the GPS
Unit and remain omitted for the duration of the simulation. Using the target list
enables the removal of the satellites specifically in view of the area of operations,
instead of removing a satellite at random which may not be important. This also
implies a red force capability to identify and rapidly target specific satellites. The
number of satellites removed ranges from zero to ten of the initial satellites and is
used in combination with either the nominal or degraded operations scenarios.
Designed Experiment.
A full factorial designed experiment is performed which provides insight into the
most important variables impacting the selected responses. The responses of interest
are the selected metrics to assess resiliency. Additionally, the designed experiment is
composed of two factors. The first factor is the use of either the nominal or degraded
operations, while the second factor is structured on the number of satellites removed.
Using the results from the designed experiment, it is possible to determine which
factor most impacts the overall resiliency.
3.6 Summary
The WMD removal scenario provided by SMC is highly complex yet adaptable for
additional analysis on the GPS constellation resiliency in an urban canyon environ-
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ment. The simulation is composed of opposing blue and red forces which are assisted
by a range of support assets. The simulation revolves around the actions of the SOF
team which maneuvers through the city to evacuate the WMD. During the maneuver
period, the SOF team is continually confronted by red military forces in their attempt
to eliminate the SOF team. A principle support structure for the SOF team is the
GPS constellation providing navigation knowledge. The agent based actors in the
model are limited by several assumptions to include GPS degradation when the SOF
team is near to buildings. To further augment the degradation, several changes are
made to the TPL code in SEAS model. The first change is to selectively comment
out specific satellites from the model. The second change is to the GPS Unit logic
which decreases the GPS accuracy and availability characteristics as the number of
satellites in view decrease. To assess the resiliency of the GPS constellation, a series
of metrics are selected to support the list of campaign level priorities. The metrics are
then assessed across scenarios to determine if there is a statistical difference which
provides insight into resiliency. Furthermore, a designed experiment helps provide
additional insight into the most important factors behind a specific metric. Chapter
4 presents the analysis derived from the Methodology along with insights gained into
GPS constellation resiliency.
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IV. ANALYSIS
4.1 Overview
Chapter 4 presents the analysis performed as described in the Methodology and
the results attained. First, the appropriate sample size is determined for each scenario
along with the required number of model runs. Next, the initial investigation into the
data is performed through a series of Paired T or difference of proportions tests and
confidence intervals to determine if there is a statistically significant difference in the
metrics across scenarios. Those metrics which appear to be important are identified
and selected for further analysis. The analysis section also describes the process of
attaining all of the production replications required for the designed experiment. Once
all of the data is collected, a graphical analysis of the data is presented. Furthermore,
a series of linear regression models are generated to determine which factors are most
influential for a specific metric. The Analysis chapter concludes with a brief summary
of the results which is extended upon in Chapter 5.
4.2 Sample Size and Model Runs
The number of replications for each design point is driven by the need to provide
accurate analysis balanced with the resources required to complete one replication.
Fortunately, each replication of the simulation only requires several minutes on a
personal laptop. However, it is not advantageous to perform as many replications
as possible as the information gained from the additional replications experiences a
diminishing margin of return. Instead, the sample size is determined to provide a
reasonable standard deviation relative to the mean value for all metrics. We looked
closely at results for 20, 25, and 30 replications and selected 25 replications as a good
balance across all metrics. For the remainder of the study each design point contains
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25 replications.
Model parameters for the normal and degraded operations can be varied within
a single SEAS warfile with the use of the run matrix logic included in the original
model. By choosing to remove satellites by commenting out appropriate portions of
the TPL code within a SEAS warfile, each change in number of satellites removed
requires a modified warfile. Therefore, the study runs are broken into 50 replications
as further discussed in this chapter.
4.3 Initial Analysis
To gain an initial perspective on the data, an initial analysis is composed of a
variety of scenarios at the extreme and moderate levels of each factor. The metrics
for each scenario are compared to determine if there is a statistically significant differ-
ence. The presence of a statistical difference indicates a metric which is impacted by
the factor level changes to the simulation. While initial insight is possible through all
metrics, the metrics which do exhibit a statistical difference are considered for further
analysis. Additionally, the sensitivity of a metric to the initial design points provides
information on the range of the factor levels used in the designed experiment. An-
other benefit of the initial analysis is the generation of the confidence intervals which
display the expected range of difference for each metric. The magnitude and range
of the confidence interval provides information into the extent of the difference. Fur-
thermore, observing patterns and anomalies in the results leads directly to inferences
on the resiliency of the GPS constellation.
Selected Scenarios.
The six selected initial scenarios represent the center and end design points be-
tween of the number of satellites removed and the type of operations. By examining
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the extreme scenarios in conjunction with moderate scenarios allows for greater ini-
tial insight over the range of the study. The scenarios are performed in pairs between
nominal and degraded operations where the number of satellites removed is held con-
stant. As a result, each run matrix for this initial simulation contains 50 replications
of which the first 25 are allocated to the nominal operations and the remaining 25
replications to the degraded operations. Table 3 displays the initial scenarios.
Table 3. Initial Analysis Scenarios
Scenario Availability Accuracy (m) Number of Satellites Removed Reps
1 0.95 5 0 25
2 0.85 10 0 25
3 0.95 5 5 (9, 1, 31, 17, 23) 25
4 0.85 10 5 (9, 1, 31, 17, 23) 25
5 0.95 5 10 (9, 1, 31, 17, 23, 20, 11, 8, 4, 32) 25
6 0.85 10 10 (9, 1, 31, 17, 23, 20, 11, 8, 4, 32) 25
Metric Averages.
The raw output data from the scenarios shown in Table 3 provide information on
the mean values of the metrics in the analysis. A summary of the mean values are
presented in Tables 4 and 5 for the nominal and degraded operations respectfully.
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Table 4. Metric Averages for Nominal Operations
Metric
Number of Satellites Removed
0 5 10
P50 68.00% 44.00% 8.00%
Duration (min) 73.00 80.52 120.31
Casualties 16.76 19.76 33.44
Engagements 4.44 6.64 10.24
% Time Lost 0.37% 1.12% 2.35%
% < 4 GPS 0.25% 1.70% 45.71%
% > 6 GPS 63.61% 54.35% 7.46%
Table 5. Metrics Averages for Degraded Operations
Metric
Number of Satellites Removed
0 5 10
P50 40.00% 24.00% 12.00%
Duration (min) 84.13 100.21 139.35
Casualties 23.68 28.44 33.00
Engagements 7.12 10.72 11.20
% Time Lost 1.31% 1.97% 3.12%
% < 4 GPS 0.67% 3.04% 40.68%
% > 6 GPS 66.85% 59.01% 15.76%
Both Tables 4 and 5 support intuitive trends across scenarios. For example,
while holding the operations constant as GPS satellites are removed, the scenarios
report on average a lower value for P50, longer duration, higher number of casualties,
higher number of engagements, an increased percentage of time lost, and fewer satel-
lites available to the GPS unit. Holding the number of satellites removed constant
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and looking across operations generally shows that the degraded operations perform
poorly when compared to the nominal operations. There are a few exceptions where
the degraded operations performs better than the nominal operations; however, it
is important to remember that these are only mean value comparisons and do not
contain an assessment of a statistical difference. Nevertheless, Tables 4 and 5 provide
an intuitive first perspective to the metrics.
Paired T and Difference of Proportions Comparisons.
The scenario comparisons gain statistical rigor through the use of the Paired T test
on the duration, casualties, and engagement metrics while the difference of propor-
tions confidence interval is used on the remaining metrics which are all percentages.
There are several ways to compare point estimators for the mean; however, the Paired
T test is the least restrictive in terms of assumptions. One condition for the Paired T
test is that the differences between the paired replications should be approximately
normally distributed [35]. Fortunately, the Paired T test is rather robust to non-
normal data. As a result, with a sample size of 25 replications, we assume that the
difference data is approximately normally distributed and passes the first condition.
Typically, the Paired T test is required for dependent data which can be achieved by
using synchronized random numbers. In this study, we do not attempt to synchro-
nize the random numbers in the simulation and as a result we can conclude that the
replications are independent. Therefore, the Paired T test is an acceptable method
for comparing the numerical metrics.
The compilation of the Paired T test and confidence interval provide insight into
the difference between the metrics in each scenario. The p-value from the Paired T
test provides information on the extent of the null hypothesis conclusion to either
reject or fail to reject a difference between the metrics in the scenario comparison. In
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addition, the confidence interval displays the point estimator of the difference along
with a range which contains 95% of the observed differences. For cases where we reject
the null hypothesis at α = 0.05 level of significance, the 95% confidence interval does
not contain zero. Both of these results indicate a statistically significant difference
between the scenarios.
The proportion metrics are not compared with the Paired T test, but instead
through the difference in proportions confidence interval. The data contained in each
of the replications for P50 are distributed binomially as either a success or failure. As
a result, the differences in the Paired T test are not normally distributed or insightful.
Additionally, the remaining proportion metrics cannot be assessed through the Paired
T test due to inaccuracies in the standard error calculations. Instead, the appropriate
comparison method is to determine if the difference in proportions confidence interval
contains zero. The proportion confidence interval is shown in Equation 1 [19] where
pˆ1 and pˆ2 represent the proportion correct from the replications of each scenario.
p1 − p2 = pˆ1 − pˆ2 ± Z0.025
√√√√ pˆ1(1− pˆ1)
n1
+
pˆ2(1− pˆ2)
n2
(1)
Two key differences between the proportion and Paired T test confidence interval
are the standard error and distribution statistic. The standard error for a propor-
tion requires a pooled variance estimation from both populations. Each individual
variance is also calculated by taking the product of the proportion correct and the
proportion of failure and the total number of replications. Furthermore, the difference
of proportions interval uses a z statistic in place of the t statistic used for the Paired
T.
45
Initial Comparison.
Several important trends are identified from the initial analysis which provide
insight into satellite resiliency and direct the remainder of the analysis. A compiled
table of the p-value results for each of the metric comparisons across the different
scenarios are shown Tables 6, 8, and 10. Note that p-values are provided for the
Paired T test and either a “Reject” (p-value ≤ 0.05) or fail to reject “FTR” for
the difference of proportions. Additionally, the confidence interval for each metric
comparison is summarized with the mean and half width shown in Tables 7, 9,
and 11. Bolded cells indicate that there is a statistically significant difference for the
metric in the given scenario comparison.
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Table 6. Nominal vs Degraded P-Value Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Nom-0 vs Degrad-0 Nom-5 vs Degrad-5 Nom-10 vs Degrad-10
P50 Reject FTR FTR
Duration (min) 0.01 0.00 0.01
Casualties 0.13 0.02 0.82
Engagements 0.03 0.01 0.13
% Time Lost FTR FTR FTR
% < 4 GPS FTR FTR FTR
% > 6 GPS FTR FTR FTR
Table 7. Nominal vs Degraded Confidence Interval Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Degrad-0 - Nom-0 Degrad-5 - Nom-5 Degrad-10 - Nom-10
P50 -0.28% ± 0.27% -0.20% ± 0.26% 0.04% ± 0.17%
Duration (min) 11.13 ± 7.97 19.69 ± 7.81 19.04 ± 13.97
Casualties 6.92 ± 9.14 8.68 ± 7.21 -0.44 ± 3.88
Engagements 2.68 ± 2.34 4.08 ± 2.83 0.96 ± 1.28
% Time Lost 0.01% ± 0.05% 0.01% ± 0.07% 0.01% ± 0.09%
% < 4 GPS -0.00% ± 0.04% 0.01% ± 0.08% -0.05% ± 0.27%
% > 6 GPS 0.03% ± 0.26% 0.05% ± 0.27% 0.08% ± 0.18%
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Table 8. Nominal vs Num Sats Removed P-Value Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Nom-0 vs Nom-5 Nom-0 vs Nom-10 Nom-5 vs Nom-10
P50 FTR Reject Reject
Duration (min) 0.05 0.00 0.00
Casualties 0.57 0.00 0.00
Engagements 0.14 0.00 0.00
% Time Lost FTR FTR FTR
% < 4 GPS FTR Reject Reject
% > 6 GPS FTR Reject Reject
Table 9. Nominal vs Num Sats Removed Confidence Interval Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Nom-5 - Nom-0 Nom-10 - Nom-0 Nom-10 - Nom-5
P50 -0.24% ± 0.27% -0.60% ± 0.21% -0.36% ± 0.22%
Duration (min) 7.52 ±7.40 47.31 ± 11.18 39.79 ± 9.38
Casualties 3.00 ± 10.86 16.68 ± 8.21 13.68 ± 6.59
Engagements 2.20 ± 3.00 5.80 ± 2.28 3.60 ± 2.07
% Time Lost 0.01% ± 0.05% 0.02% ± 0.06% 0.01% ± 0.07%
% < 4 GPS 0.01% ± 0.05% 0.45% ± 0.20% 0.44% ± 0.20%
% > 6 GPS -0.09% ± 0.27% -0.56% ± 0.21% -0.47% ± 0.22%
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Table 10. Degraded vs Num Sats Removed P-Value Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Degrad-0 vs Degrad-5 Degrad-0 vs Degrad-10 Degrad-5 vs Degrad-10
P50 FTR Reject FTR
Duration (min) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Casualties 0.11 0.01 0.02
Engagements 0.00 0.00 0.53
% Time Lost FTR FTR FTR
% < 4 GPS FTR Reject Reject
% > 6 GPS FTR Reject Reject
Table 11. Degraded vs Num Sats Removed Confidence Interval Comparison
Metric
Scenario Comparison
Degrad-5 - Degrad-0 Degrad-10 - Degrad-0 Degrad-10 - Degrad-5
P50 -0.16% ± 0.25% -0.28% ± 0.23% -0.12% ± 0.21%
Duration (min) 16.08 ± 6.67 55.22 ± 12.45 39.14 ± 11.63
Casualties 4.76 ± 5.96 9.32 ± 6.30 4.56 ± 3.64
Engagements 3.60 ± 2.38 4.08 ± 1.98 0.48 ± 1.55
% Time Lost 0.01% ± 0.07% 0.02% ± 0.08% 0.01% ± 0.09%
% < 4 GPS 0.02% ± 0.07% 0.40% ± 0.20% 0.38% ± 0.20%
% > 6 GPS -0.08% ± 0.27% -0.51% ± 0.23% -0.43% ± 0.24%
Initial Insights.
The first broad trend observed across the p-value comparison tables is the fewer
number of significant p-values when comparing the nominal and degraded operations
with the same number of satellites removed. The trend shows that the model is
49
more sensitive to the number of satellites lost for a given operation configuration
versus strictly the difference between the nominal and degraded operations. This is
an intuitive result, as the difference between the nominal and degraded operations is
not severe, but the removal of multiple satellites should drastically impact the model
and create significant differences in the metrics. The insight gained is useful moving
forward and provides verification to the model acting as anticipated under specific
configurations.
The second broad trend is that the percentage of time lost is continually insignif-
icant across all scenarios. Additionally, the point estimator and half widths observed
in Tables 7, 9, and 11 are small in magnitude. As a result, it is possible to con-
clude that GPS constellation degradation is not significantly impacting the overall
percentage of time in which the SOF team is lost.
Within the specific metrics there are several trends which are nearly significant in
every scenario. The first is mission duration which is always significantly different and
always increases in value with increased degradation. Tables 7, 9, and 11 also show
that there is a large difference between scenarios as indicated by the point estimators
in the confidence intervals and half widths. This helps support the conclusion of
practically as well as statistically difference in the metrics. A key insight attained from
the trend is that the overall mission duration is highly sensitive to GPS performance.
If the WMD needs to be removed within a small time window, having the highest
performing GPS constellation would be critical.
Two often significant metrics which provide similar information are the percentage
of time less than four GPS and greater than six GPS satellites are available. As
satellites are removed the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available
tends to increase while the percentage of time greater than six GPS satellites are
available tends to decrease. It is important to note that the significant difference
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only occurs when the nominal or degraded scenarios are compared with removing ten
satellites. This is an intuitive result as removing a large portion of the initial ten
satellites in view reduces the overall number of satellites available over the duration
of the mission. It is also interesting to note that the point estimator and half width
for the comparison between five and ten satellites removed is nearly identical to the
statistics from zero to ten satellites removed. As a result, it is possible to conclude
that the majority of the impact from removing satellites occurs after five satellites
have been removed.
Another key insight gained from both metrics is that the GPS constellation is
not able to quickly recover from a large number of lost satellites with the remaining
satellites in orbit. Even though the expansive GPS constellation contains many satel-
lites in several different plains, the originally non-impacted satellites will not reach
the area of interest in time to restore capability. This is primarily due to the short
duration of the selected mission of under a few hours. In reality, a GPS satellite takes
12 hours to complete one orbit around the Earth which is not fast enough to provide
near instantaneous resiliency to the constellation. Note in this study we do not con-
sider activating spare satellites or launching additional satellites into the constellation
as a responsive tactic referenced in the Literature Review. As a result of the insight
gained, the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available is retained
which represents the more crucial capability of three dimensional geolocation.
A further specific insight is connected to the decrease in P50 with an increase in
casualties and number of engagements. The evidence is located in Table 8 where
there is a difference between metrics with a larger number of satellites removed.
Interestingly, there is not a statistically significant difference between zero and five
satellite removals which may be an indication of an non linear increase in the metrics
with increased satellite removals. Similar evidence is shown in Table 10, but it is
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not as convincing. Overall, the observed trend supports intuition as an increased
number of engagements should lead to more casualties which reduces the chance of
losing less than 25 soldiers. Tables 9 and 11 also show that the mean values for the
number of casualties and engagements also increase as the number of satellites are
removed. The significant changes in the metrics are all indications that a reduced
GPS constellation is degrading mission performance. As a result, the number of
casualties and engagements are retained for further analysis.
Several important insights are developed from the initial perspective on the data.
First, is that mission duration is highly sensitive to GPS degradation while the per-
centage of time lost is not sensitive. Furthermore, the percentage of time less than four
GPS satellites and the percentage of time greater than six GPS satellites are avail-
able are intuitively impacted by a reduced number of GPS satellites which presents
an initial conclusion on the inherent lack of resiliency of the GPS constellation over
short mission durations. Additionally, the connection between P50 to number of ca-
sualties and engagements is displayed throughout the p-value and confidence interval
comparisons. As a result, four metrics provide insight into the model which include
mission duration, number of casualties, number of engagements, and percentage of
time less than four GPS satellites are available. Each of the four metrics receives fur-
ther analysis in order to gain additional insight into the GPS constellation resiliency.
4.4 Full Production Runs
The full experiment involves the remaining data from the additional scenarios.
The objective is to have data from every level of satellite removal from zero to ten for
both the nominal and degraded operations. Table 12 depicts the run configurations
required to collect all of the necessary data.
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Table 12. Full Production Runs
Factor Levels Design Points Total Reps
Operations 2 22 550
Number of Sats Removed 11
4.5 Graphical Insight
The JMP statistical package is used for data analysis. Compelling insight and
a greater understanding of the model outputs is achieved by observing several plots
of the metrics with respect to the number of satellites removed. Additionally, the
replications are grouped based upon their type of operations as either nominal or
degraded. The distinct patterns are interpretted and retained for further analysis.
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Mission Duration vs Number of Satellites Removed.
The first graph of interest plots the individual 95% confidence intervals of the
mission duration as the number of satellites removed increases as shown in Figure 6.
The confidence intervals show a generally increasing trend in mission duration as the
number of satellites removed increase regardless of the type of operations. A key ob-
servation from the “Degraded” section of the graph displays a distinct jump between
five and six satellites removed where the confidence intervals no longer overlap. This
is an indication of a statistically longer mission duration once the GPS constellation
loses six satellites.
Figure 6. Mission Duration Individual 95% Confidence Interval Graph
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Number of Engagements vs Number of Satellites Removed.
A similar and more abrupt pattern is observed in the “Degraded” portion of the
individual 95% confidence interval graph for the number of engagements shown in
Figure 7. The jump occurs between four and five satellites removed which is similar
to the threshold noted from mission duration. An important insight gained is that
there is a statistically significant increase in the number of engagements if the GPS
constellation loses more than four satellites.
Figure 7. Number of Engagements Individual 95% Confidence Interval Graph
Number of Casualties vs Number of Satellites Removed.
Another response providing insight are the individual 95% confidence intervals
associated with the number of casualties as shown in Figure 8. The graphic shows an
increasing trend in the number of casualties as the scenario becomes more degraded.
The key observation from the “Degraded” portion of Figure 8 is the narrowing of the
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confidence interval after removing four satellites. A smaller range of the confidence
interval is indicative of a reduction in variation from the replications. At the moment
it is not obvious what is causing the variance reduction; however, it is important to
infer that there is a consistently high number of casualties once a large number of
satellites have been removed.
Figure 8. Number of Casualties Individual 95% Confidence Interval Graph
Percentage of GPS Satellites Available vs Number of Satellites Re-
moved.
Observing the data output for the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites
are available provides information into the exponential nature of the response variable
as shown in Figure 9. The output data is displayed instead of the confidence intervals
due to the inability to automatically display the correct proportion confidence inter-
vals required for the metric. Nevertheless, the output data does display results which
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provide insight into the response. The data remains fairly constant until more than
seven satellites are removed at which point the percentage of time in which less than
four GPS satellites are in view increases dramatically. A similar graph is displayed
from the data output from the percentage of time greater than six GPS satellites are
available shown in Figure 10. The threshold now occurs around five to six satellites
removed and displays a dramatic decrease in the response variable. Both of the re-
ponses are highly dependent upon the number of number of satellites available. If
too many satellite are removed then it is increasingly likely to register high values for
the percentage of time there are fewer than four satellites available and low values for
the percentage of time that there are greater than six satellites available.
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Figure 9. Percent of Time Less Than Four GPS Satellites Available Output Data
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Figure 10. Percent of Time Greater Than Six GPS Satellites Available Output Data
P50 vs Number of Satellies Removed.
Figure 11 provides the mean value for P50 when compared with the number of
satellites removed. Similar to the output data shown in Figures 9 and 10, the mean
value is the most accessible and yet still insightful perspective on P50. As evident
by both type of operations, P50 is negatively impacted by an increasing number of
satellites removed. When large numbers of satellites are removed, it appears as though
there is a small probability of completing the mission with fewer than 25 casualties.
Additionally, the low starting point for the “Degraded” operations even when none
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of the satellites have been removed is an important disparity worth noting.
Figure 11. P50 Mean Value Graph
4.6 DOE
A designed experiment is performed to determine how the factors effect the re-
sponse variables. Due to the minimal resources required to complete one replication, a
full factorial design is utilized to provide un-aliased analysis between the levels of the
factors. Insights are gained from an effects model which focuses on each factor along
with the interaction between the factors. The results are analyzed in the two-factor
analysis of variance (ANOVA) table to determine the significance of each factor. [23]
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Responses.
The responses under consideration are the mission duration, number of casualties,
number of engagements, and the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are
available, as identified as being sensitive to the factors in the initial analysis. Mission
duration is classified as a continuous response where as casualties and engagements are
integer variables. The percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available
is also unique in that it is continuous, but is bounded between 0 and 1. Each of the
responses are analyzed through the ANOVA.
Factors.
There are two factors used in the model to include the type of operations and the
number of satellites removed. The type of operations is a nominal variable composed
of two levels; nominal or degraded operations as described in Chapter 3. The number
of removed satellites from the model is the second factor which is also considered
nominal and has 11 different levels to reflect the integer value of satellites removed
from zero to ten. The full factorial run configuration requires 22 different design
points to cover all combinations of the factors.
ANOVA.
The ANOVA is performed on each response variable by using both factors and
their interaction. Upon further inspection, the addition of the interaction variable
between the factors does not provide any significant benefit to the model. Instead,
the marginal gain in model statistics with the interaction term is not worth over
fitting the model with a new set of variables. Furthermore, with the exception of the
percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available, the lack of fit test did
not reject the null hypothesis indicating that an interaction term is not necessary.
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As a result, all of the regression models are restricted to using the single factors as
effects.
Key results from the ANOVA include the significance of the overall model along
with the individual factors. Furthermore, the numerical impact of each factor and
factor level is estimated to provide specific insight into the impact on the response.
Additionally, using Tukey’s test allows for the statistical pairwise comparison be-
tween the levels of each factor providing more insight into any large changes in the
responses. ANOVA enables insight into the specific situations which most impact
GPS constellation resiliency.
Assumption Verification.
There are four assumptions to check before interpreting the results from the
ANOVA. The assumptions assess the residuals of the ANOVA model on their normal-
ity, independence, constant variance against predicted values, and constant variance
against the variables of the model. The residuals exhibit normality for all of the
ANOVA models as shown by a histogram and normal probability plots of the residu-
als shown in the Appendix A. One minor normality violation may be present in the
percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available model where the major-
ity of the residuals are contained near the center of the distribution. Independence
of the residuals is not directly assessed in the study, however, we can confidently
conclude that each replication is initiated with its own random number and that the
simulation is not dependent upon the results from the previous replication. The resid-
uals versus predicted plots yield some concern as far as non-constance variance for all
of the ANOVA models, however, no transformations are performed on the responses.
The non-constant variance does not appear to be severe enough to warrant the loss of
interpret-ability from a transformation. Furthermore, almost all of the residual versus
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variable plots exhibit constant variance with the except of the percentage of time less
than four GPS satellites are available model where the residuals appear to fan out-
ward with an increasing number of removed satellites. Overall, the model residuals
meet all of the required assumptions for the ANOVA models and the respective plots
are displayed in the Appendix A.
Summary Statistics.
The ANOVA models are generated in JMP and the parameter estimates are avail-
able in the appendix. Summary statistics from each of the models are displayed in
Table 13.
Table 13. ANOVA Model Statistics w/o Interaction Term
Summary Statistics
Response
Duration Casualties Engagement % < 4 GPS
R2 0.577 0.255 0.327 0.922
R2-adj 0.568 0.24 0.314 0.92
MSE 385.4 158.36 15.593 0.002
Overall F < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001
Lack of Fit 0.0627 0.0771 0.4188 < .0001
Operations < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 0.0988
Sats Removed < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001
All of the generated models are significant due to the results from the overall
model F test, however several models explain a larger proportion of the total variance
in the data. The R2 and R2-adj statistics assess the proportion of the total variance
explained by the specific model. The results show that the mission duration and
percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available models explain a larger
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proportion of the total variance than the number of casualties and engagements. As a
result, it is possible to conclude that mission duration and percentage of time less than
four GPS satellites are available are more sensitive to the factors than the number
of casualties and engagements. Intuition supports the high R2 and R2-adj statistics
dependency of the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available model
due to the inherent relationship between removing satellites from the model and the
possibility of having fewer satellites in view. Additionally, as mentioned above all of
the models except percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available fail
to reject the lack of fit test demonstrating that interaction terms are not required and
that the models are properly specified.
Both operations and the number of satellites removed are significant factors in the
models. One exception occurs for the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites
are available response where operations is not significant indicating that the type of
operations does not significantly impact the metric. Aside from the one exception,
there is compelling evidence to suggest that the factors are highly significant variables
toward defining the metrics. As a result, it is possible to conclude that adequately
controlling the type of operations and the number of satellites removed is essential
for improving satellite resiliency.
Pairwise Comparison - Tukey Test.
To gain further insight into the ANOVA models, the Tukey test is used to perform
a pair-wise comparison of the levels of the number of satellites removed. The mission
duration model demonstrates that there are several important locations in terms of
the number of satellites removed. The results from the Tukey test are shown in
Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Mission Duration Tukey Test Results
There are several unique groupings displayed in the Tukey test results for the du-
ration model. The first grouping displays that removing eight, nine, or ten satellites
produces statistically similar outputs that are statistically different from the remain-
ing levels of satellites removed. Other groupings occur for six and seven satellite
removals along with the remaining zero through five satellite removals. Each of the
groupings indicate specific threshold values for the levels that will generate the same
response. For example, the GPS constellation could lose from zero to five satellites
and experience the same impact to mission duration. However, once a sixth satellite is
removed, then the GPS constellation experiences degradation leading to an extended
missions duration above 100 minutes on average. If more than seven satellites are
removed, then mission duration increase to 120 minutes on average. As a result, the
different threshold levels provide information into satellite resiliency.
Similar insight is attained from the Tukey plots from each of the ANOVA models.
The results from the Tukey test for the number of casualties response are shown in
Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Casualties Tukey Test Results
The most important shift observed in Figure 13 is the jump around five satellites
removed. The grouping of satellite removals from zero to four reports below 20
casualties on average whereas the group from six to ten report near 30 casualties. As
a result, the threshold level is the removal of five satellites where the GPS constellation
is resilient in terms of the number of casualties.
The results from the Tukey test for the number of engagements response are shown
in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Engagements Tukey Test Results
There are two distinct groups identified in the Tukey test with the threshold
located by removing five satellites. The average number of engagements appear to
double in mean value once more than four satellites are removed. From the insight
gained it is possible to conclude that the GPS constellation exhibits resiliency until
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more than four satellites are removed. As a result, maintaining the performance of
the GPS constellation is achievable by ensuring that the number of satellites removed
does not exceed four.
The results from the Tukey test for the percentage of time less than four GPS
satellites are available response are shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. % < 4 GPS Tukey Test Results
As displayed in Figure 15, the width on the confidence interval is small with
relation to the other Tukey plots. Additionally, removing zero through five satellites
does not generate a significant difference in the percentage of time less than four GPS
satellites are available. However, every additional satellite removed creates a different
output for the response. As a result, the threshold value for resiliency is located at five
satellites removed. Additionally, it is important to note that mitigating the number
of satellites removed beyond five is important as each satellite removed creates a
significant difference. Also worth consideration is a large jump between seven and
eight satellite removals where the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are
available triples in value. Avoiding the loss of an extreme number of GPS satellites
improves overall GPS constellation resiliency.
Each of the Tukey plots provide unique insight into the levels of the number of
satellites removed factor and help identify the critical thresholds for assessing satellite
resiliency. Across all of the Tukey plots, it appears as though losing more than five
67
GPS satellites leads to significant differences in the response variable. If the number
of satellites lost can be kept below five, then it is possible to maintain response values
that are similar to a scenario with zero satellites lost. The ability to operate in a
degraded state with a number of satellites removed and still provide the initial metric
values indicates that the GPS constellation is resilient. As a result, it is possible to
conclude that the GPS constellation is resilient up to the removal of five satellites
from the initial configuration.
4.7 Conclusion
Chapter 4 performs the analysis and interprets the results as they pertain to GPS
constellation resiliency. The initial analysis is used to gain a first perspective into
the output data from a series of design points. The p-values from the Paired T test
and confidence intervals reveal that mission duration, number of casualties, number
of engagements, and the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available
are sensitive to the factors. Furthermore, an increased number of satellites removed
appears to increase the sensitivity of the metrics and create statistically significant
differences. Completing the remaining production runs enables the graphical analysis
of the output data. Several of the confidence interval graphs display trends along with
threshold values to statistically significant differences in the metric. Additionally,
graphs of the data as satellites are removed show exponential trends in the number
the satellites available along with a sharp decrease in the P50 metric. Finally, a formal
ANOVA model for each response variable is generated which provides insight into the
significance of the effects. In general, the ANOVA models pass the assumption tests
along with providing significance p-values for each of the factors. The most compelling
takeaway from Chapter 4 are the results from the pairwise Tukey Test between the
levels of the number of satellites removed. It is evident in each of the four selected
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metrics that there is a threshold value once five satellites have been removed. As
soon as a sixth satellite is removed the metrics register a significant difference in
value. As a result, it is possible to conclude that the GPS constellation provides
the highest level of performance and exhibits resiliency until five satellites have been
removed, at which point the GPS constellation experiences a significant decrease in
performance, both statistically and practically. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the
most important results from the analysis along with areas for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Overview
Chapter 5 concludes the study on GPS constellation resiliency. The chapter fo-
cuses on the contributions provided through the Methodology along with a summary
of the important insights from the analysis. Each of the insights provide evidence
that supports the conclusion on the GPS constellation resiliency. Chapter 5 also
details areas for further research that provide more insight and refinement into the
assessment of satellite resiliency. The chapter concludes with a conclusion for the
study.
5.2 Contributions and Analysis Conclusions
Assessing satellite resiliency is a recent topic that has gained traction due to the
increasing availability of threats and our increasing dependency on space assets. Due
to the new emphasis, there are only a few studies which model and assess satellite
constellation resiliency. Our research specifically focuses on the resiliency of the GPS
constellation in an urban canyon environment. Additionally, the research provides a
new perspective for modeling satellite constellation resiliency by using the agent-based
SEAS program and collecting metrics from a top level mission viewpoint. Traditional
studies on the GPS constellation have a technical perspective where the specific GPS
parameters, such as position dilution of precision (PDOP), are compared across de-
graded scenarios. In reality, however, what might be a statistically significant dif-
ference between the PDOP in a scenario comparison, might not actually impact the
mission in which the GPS constellation is supporting. Instead, by using an agent-
based model and capturing top level mission metrics, the SOF team in our model can
stochastically respond to a degraded GPS constellation to determine if there is an
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impact to the overall mission. While there is not one definitive metric for resiliency
as noted during the Literature Review, a compilation of output statistics provide in-
sight into constellation resiliency. Each of the selected metrics connect back to the
mission priorities which include minimizing casualties, duration, engagements, and
the percentage of time less than four GPS satellites are available. Furthermore, the
logic within the SEAS warfile has been adapted to provide degradation to the GPS
constellation performance with the removal of satellites. As a result, the research
provides a new methodology for future studies into satellite constellation resiliency.
To further strengthen the study, the analysis is given statistical rigor through
difference hypothesis tests and confidence intervals. The initial analysis reveals that
the model is sensitive to a large increase in the number of satellites removed from
the simulation. Furthermore, it appears as though the majority of the impact to the
metrics occurs between five and ten satellites removed which indicates that degraded
GPS performance may have an non linear impact with an increase in satellites re-
moved. It is also evident from the full production run data that mission duration
is highly impacted by removing satellites as shown in Figure 6. Additionally, the
mission duration is also increased in the “Degraded” operations. Similar results are
shown with the number of engagements and casualties in Figures 7 and 8 respectfully.
Another important conclusion is the large disparity between the type of operations
and the low values for the P50 metric as shown in Figure 11. All of the initial sta-
tistical conclusions confirm intuition that the top level mission statistics are highly
impacted by a large loss of GPS satellites.
The designed experiment and ANOVA also support the conclusion that reducing
the number of GPS satellites significantly impacts the response variables. Each of the
ANOVA results are summarized in Table 13 which shows that the mission duration
and percentage of time that there are less than four GPS satellites available are the
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strongest models in terms of R2-adj. Furthermore, it appears as though the number
of satellites removed is a significant factor for all of the responses. The key insight
gained from the ANOVA models is found in the series of Tukey tests on the number
of satellites removed for each of the models. Tukey’s test clearly indicates a threshold
value near five satellites removed where the metrics experience a significant shift
in response values. The significant difference indicates that the GPS constellation is
exhibiting resiliency even though several satellites have been removed from the model.
As a result, the designed experiment provides further support for the initial analysis
along with the most compelling insights into satellite resiliency.
The analysis suggests that the GPS constellation in our scenario does exhibit re-
siliency in a degraded urban canyon environment. The ability to provide statistically
similar model output metrics indicates that even though the GPS specific param-
eters are degraded, the overall mission performance is not impacted. This finding
connects directly back to the selected definition of resiliency from AFSPC which is,
“the ability of a system architecture to continue providing required capabilities in
the face of system failures, environmental challenges, or adversary action” [3]. We
believe the resiliency of the GPS constellation is inherent in the constellation design
which has nearly a dozen satellites initially over the area of interest. The large num-
ber of satellites over the area of interest is due to the global coverage pattern of the
constellation which provides a large amount of overlap. While the GPS constellation
does exhibit resiliency, it is not resilient beyond the loss of five satellites. The Tukey
plots, Paired T tests, and confidence intervals support this conclusion by indicat-
ing a quickly changing negative impact in the response metrics after more than five
satellites are lost. Additionally, as noted in the initial analysis, if nearly all of the
satellites initially available are removed from the scenario, then the GPS constella-
tion does not provide instantaneous resiliency for a short mission duration. Instead,
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a longer mission would be able to recover as soon as the remaining GPS satellites
pass over the area of interest. Furthermore, it is important to note that the threshold
value near five satellites lost and conclusions developed throughout the analysis are
heavily dependent upon the GPS Unit logic in the SEAS warfile. As a result, policy
considerations on the resiliency of the GPS constellation require more specific study.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence indicates that the GPS constellation is resilient.
5.3 Future Research
There are several areas for further research found in the GPS Unit logic structure,
the factors included in the designed experiment, the geometry of the the GPS satel-
lites, and the satellite constellation under consideration. It is important to remember
that this study is purely for education purposes and does not contain any sensitive
parameters which limits the model validity. Additionally, due to time constants, the
current study did not permit significant changes to the provided SEAS model. As
a result, there are several areas in which the research can be expanded and further
developed.
One area for further research is the sensitivity of the GPS Unit logic structure in
the SEAS warfile. We developed a logic structure without any direct references that
at face value appears reasonable. However, it is highly likely that further investigation
into the accuracy and availability of the GPS constellation will provide a different logic
structure. If the desire is to keep the research unclassified, then sensitivity analysis
can be performed by providing a series of different logic structures to the GPS Unit.
Then by replicating the analysis performed in this study over each of the new logic
structures it is possible to provide insight into the impact of the factors along with
determining a resiliency threshold value. Further refinement of the logic structure is
essential for adding more credibility to the study.
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Another area for further research includes incorporating additional factors to the
designed experiment. It was evident that the R2 − adj values did not perform as
desired for the number of casualties and engagement responses. An example of an
additional factor is examining the level of degradation as the SOF team is closer
to the buildings. While additional factors appear to be a straight forward improve-
ment, selecting factors which are directly connected to the GPS constellation and
implementing them into the warfile is a challenge. Nevertheless, investigating further
factors is worth the added effort in order to identify the most important pieces for
attaining satellite resiliency.
As noted by Bell’s thesis in the Literature Review, the geometry of the satellites
is important to GPS capability instead of just the number of satellites in view. For
example, a fewer number of satellite with a better geometry provides better accuracy
for the GPS reciever. Currently there is not a geolocation algorithm provided in
the SEAS warfile. Implementation of the geolocation algorithm may be challenging
within SEAS, however, successful implementation provides a more accurate model
along a new source of metrics for analysis. We highly suggest adding a geolocation
algorithm as an area for further research.
A final area for further research is to model different satellites constellations. The
GPS constellation is inherently resilient due to its number of satellites in several
difference planes. Other constellations, however, are not as diverse and may not
be able to provide the same capabilities under degraded scenarios. Furthermore,
other constellations provide unique capabilities which requires a different model with
different metrics to assess resiliency. Nevertheless, constellation resiliency is crucial
for all of our space systems and is worth the added effort.
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5.4 Conclusion
Satellite constellation resiliency is an important consideration moving forward.
Both current operational decisions and future programmatic purchases should focus
on selecting the constellation that will continue to provide the necessary capabilities
even in a contested environment. The methods and metrics for assessing satellite
resiliency are vital to ensuring that the analysis is directed properly and provides
relevant information. We have provide one method and set of metrics for assessing
the resiliency of the crucial GPS constellation in a challenging and degraded environ-
ment. While our results do indicate that the GPS constellation exhibits resiliency,
the required capabilities are negatively impacted after the loss of multiple satellites.
Further refinement of the study is required through either sensitivity analysis on
the logic structure or a more complex designed experiment in order to provide more
definitive guidance to decision makers. Also, adding a geolocation algorithm is also
an important aspect of the warfile for strengthening the validity of the model. In
addition, the methodology can be applied to other satellite constellations in order to
reveal the hidden strengths and weaknesses of our space assets. Ensuring resiliency
for all of our satellite constellations is necessary for current and future operations in
an effort to maintain national security.
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Appendix A. ANOVA ASSUMPTIONS AND MODELS
1.1 Normal Probability Plots
Figure 16. Mission Duration Normal Probability Plot
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Figure 17. Number of Casualties Normal Probability Plot
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Figure 18. Number of Engagements Normal Probability Plot
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Figure 19. % < 4 GPS Normal Probability Plot
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1.2 Residual vs Predicted Plots
Figure 20. Mission Duration Residual vs Predicted Plot
Figure 21. Number of Casualties Residual vs Predicted Plot
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Figure 22. Number of Engagements Residual vs Predicted Plot
Figure 23. % < 4 GPS Residual vs Predicted Plot
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1.3 Residual vs Variable Plots
Figure 24. Mission Duration Residual vs Operations Plot
Figure 25. Mission Duration Residual vs Number of Satellites Removed Plot
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Figure 26. Number of Casualties Residual vs Operations Plot
Figure 27. Number of Casualties Residual vs Number of Satellites Removed Plot
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Figure 28. Number of Engagements Residual vs Operations Plot
Figure 29. Number of Engagements Residual vs Number of Satellites Removed Plot
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Figure 30. % < 4 GPS Residual vs Operations Plot
Figure 31. % < 4 GPS Residual vs Number of Satellites Removed Plot
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1.4 Model Statistics
Mission Duration Model.
Figure 32. Mission Duration Model Statistics
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I Summary of Fit 
RSauare 
RSauare Adi 
Root Mean Sauare Error 
Mean of Resoonse 
Observations (or Sum Watsl 
[Analysis of Variance 
0.577032 
0.568384 
19.63158 
97.38455 
550 
Sum of 
Source OF Squares Mean Square 
Model 11 282869.30 25715.4 
F Ratio 
66.7241 
Error 538 207344.52 385.4 Prob > F 
c. Total 549 490213.82 
[lack Of Fit 
Sum of 
Source OF Squares 
LacK Of Fit 10 6735.54 
Pure Error 528 200608.98 
Total Error 538 207344.52 
[Parameter Est imates 
Mean Square 
673.554 
379.941 
<.0001' 
F Ratio 
1.7728 
Prob > F 
0.0627 
Max RSq 
0.5908 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt l 
lnterceot 97.384545 0.837093 116.34 <.0001' 
OoerationsfDearadedl 10.597273 0.837093 12.66 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites RemovedfOI -18.82155 2.647121 -7.11 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf11 -22.09655 2.647121 -8.35 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf21 -17.93855 2.647121 -6.78 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf31 -20.01055 2.647121 -7.56 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf41 -14.43755 2.647121 -5.45 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf51 -7.021545 2.647121 -2.65 0.0082' 
Number of Satellites Removedf61 4.9344545 2.647121 1.86 0.0629 
Number of Satellites Removedf71 10.034455 2.647121 3.79 0.0002' 
Number of Satellites Removedf81 23.137455 2.647121 8.74 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf91 29.776455 2.647121 11.25 <.0001' 
[Effect Tests 
Sum of 
Source Nparm OF Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
Ooerations 1 1 61766.20 160.2657 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removed 10 10 221103.10 57.3700 <.0001' 
Number of Casualties Model.
Figure 33. Number of Casualties Model Statistics
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I Summary of Fit 
RSauare 
RSauare Adi 
Root Mean Sauare Error 
Mean of Resoonse 
Observations (or Sum Watsl 
!Analysis of Variance 
0.254932 
0.239698 
12.58402 
24.43455 
550 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares Mean Square 
Model 11 29150.77 2650.07 
F Ratio 
16.7347 
Error 538 85196.37 158.36 Prob > F 
c. Total 549 114347.14 <.0001' 
I Lack Of Fit 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
LacK Of Fit 10 2660.935 266.093 1.7023 
Pure Error 528 82535.440 156.317 Prob > F 
Total Error 538 85196.375 0.0771 
Max R Sq 
0.2782 
!Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt l 
lntercect 24.434545 0.536584 45.54 <.0001' 
OoerationsfDearadedl 2.9690909 0.536584 5.53 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites RemovedfOI -4.214545 1.696829 -2.48 0.01 33' 
Number of Satellites Removedf11 -7.874545 1.696829 -4.64 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf21 -8.454545 1.696829 -4.98 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf31 -7.634545 1.696829 -4.50 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf41 -5.574545 1.696829 -3.29 0.0011' 
Number of Satellites Removedf51 -0.334545 1.696829 -0.20 0.8438 
Number of Satellites Removedf61 4.3854545 1.696829 2.58 0.0100' 
Number of Satellites Removedf71 5.5454545 1.696829 3.27 0.0012' 
Number of Satellites Removedf81 7.5854545 1.696829 4.47 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf91 7.7854545 1.696829 4.59 <.0001' 
I Effect Tests 
Sum of 
Source Nparm DF Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
Ooerations 1 1 4848.525 30.6176 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removed 10 10 24302.244 15.3464 <.0001' 
Number of Engagements Model.
Figure 34. Number of Engagements Model Statistics
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I Summary of Fit 
RSauare 
RSauare Adi 
Root Mean Sauare Error 
Mean of Resoonse 
Observations (or Sum Watsl 
!Analysis of Variance 
0.327436 
0.313685 
3.948802 
7.825455 
550 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares Mean Square 
Model 11 4084.189 371.290 
F Ratio 
23.8113 
Error 538 8389.055 15.593 Prob > F 
c. Total 549 12473.244 
I Lack Of Fit 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares 
LacK Of Fit 10 160.0945 
Pure Error 528 8228.9600 
Total Error 538 8389.0545 
!Parameter Est imates 
Mean Square 
16.0095 
15.5852 
<.0001' 
F Ratio 
1.0272 
Prob > F 
0.4188 
Max RSq 
0.3403 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt l 
lntercect 7.8254545 0.168377 46.48 <.0001' 
OoerationsfDearadedl 1.3709091 0.168377 8.14 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites RemovedfOI -2.045455 0.532456 -3.84 0.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf11 -3.045455 0.532456 -5.72 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf21 -2.785455 0.532456 -5.23 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf31 -2.505455 0.532456 -4.71 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf41 -1.925455 0.532456 -3.62 0.0003' 
Number of Satellites Removedf51 0.8545455 0.532456 1.60 0.1091 
Number of Satellites Removedf61 1.3745455 0.532456 2.58 0.0101' 
Number of Satellites Removedf71 1.4145455 0.532456 2.66 0.0081' 
Number of Satellites Removedf81 2.5945455 0.532456 4.87 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf91 3.1745455 0.532456 5.96 <.0001' 
I Effect Tests 
Sum of 
Source Nparm DF Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
Ooerations 1 1 1033.6655 66.2902 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removed 10 10 3050.5236 19.5634 <.0001' 
Percentage of Time < 4 GPS Available Model.
Figure 35. Percentage of Time < 4 GPS Model Statistics
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I Summary of Fit 
RSauare 
RSauare Adi 
Root Mean Sauare Error 
Mean of Resoonse 
Observations (or Sum Watsl 
!Analysis of Variance 
0.921591 
0.919988 
0.046588 
0.119996 
550 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 11 13.724934 1.24772 574.8634 
Error 538 1.167711 
c. Total 549 14.892645 
I Lack Of Fit 
Sum of 
Source DF Squares 
LacK Of Fit 10 0.0898145 
Pure Error 528 1.0778961 
Total Error 538 1.1677106 
!Parameter Est imates 
0.00217 Prob > F 
Mean Square 
0.008981 
0.002041 
<.0001' 
F Ratio 
4.3995 
Prob > F 
<.0001' 
Max R Sq 
0.9276 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt l 
lntercect 0.119996 0.001987 60.40 <.0001' 
OoerationsfDearadedl -0.003285 0.001987 -1.65 0.0988 
Number of Satellites RemovedfOI -0.115378 0.006282 -18.37 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf11 -0.117546 0.006282 -18.71 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf21 -0.11044 0.006282 -17.58 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf31 -0.107896 0.006282 -17.18 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf41 -0.112539 0.006282 -17.91 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf51 -0.096315 0.006282 -15.33 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf61 -0.063407 0.006282 -10.09 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf71 -0.029587 0.006282 -4.71 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf81 0.1893162 0.006282 30.14 <.0001' 
Number of Satellites Removedf91 0.2518659 0.006282 40.09 <.0001' 
I Effect Tests 
Sum of 
Source Nparm DF Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
Ooerations 1 1 0.005934 2.7342 0.0988 
Number of Satellites Removed 10 10 13.719000 632.0763 <.0001' 
Appendix B. ACRONYMS
ABMS = Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation
AFIT = Air Force Institute of Technology
AFSPC = Air Force Space Command
ANOVA = Analysis of Variance
ASAT = Anti-Satellite
CAS = Complex Adaptive System
DoD = Department of Defense
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
GAO = Government Accountability Office
GEO = Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
GPS = Global Positioning System
HEO = Highly Elliptical Orbit
KPP = Key Performance Parameter
LEO = Low Earth Orbit
MOE = Measure of Effectiveness
MOO = Measure of Outcome
MOP = Measure of Performance
MUA = Military Utility Analysis
ORS = Operationally Responsive Space
PDOP = Position Dilution of Precision
PNT = Position, Navigation, and Timing
REAP = Resilient Enterprise Architecture Pathfinder
SEAS = System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation
SMC = Space and Missile Center
SOF = Special Operations Force
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STK = Satellite Toolkit
TLE = Two Line Element
TPL = Tactical Programming Language
U.S. = United States
USAF = United States Air Force
WMD = Weapon of Mass Destruction
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Figure 36. ENS Quad Chart
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